I really liked that offense, and 2007. We were much more balanced and much more of a passing team them. There were always rumors that Creyer was much more conservative and that Mullinz wanted to open it up. I can't say that I saw much at Cowbell to make me think that is the case, but perhaps it was just a talent gap problem as some hope.
The spread plays are basically the spread plays. Most teams run inside zones, outside zones, q powers, varies hi lows and floods, 4 verts. But you get different offenses bc say the plays that Mullinz calls are completely different (180 degrees actually) from what the Mumme/Leach Holgerson, with Mullinz being 80% run and Mumme clan being 80% pass. The Tommy Bowden/Rich Rodriguez branch runs lots of 4 verticals. Mullinz basically runs one a half.
You shouldn't. The QB was still playing at that time. The point was that the defense can basically select what play (or group of plays) Mullinz will run by showing x number of guys in the box, then drop back into a defense tailor made for that audible. Look specifically at the interception on the play before the Qb was hurt. Mullinz has been around for a while and Bammer knew this in 2009. Hopefully he is ready to grow some.
I do think he is more likely to listen to some ideas that Spurrier has as opposed to the last hygiene-challenged azzhat we just fired. The weakness imo is that the QB goes up to the line of scrimmage, counts guys in the box, then audibles (or the team does the LEMUR OFFENSE thing, looks to the sideline and gets the play). It takes a lot of time, and we usually snapped at like 27 or 28 seconds. Defenses knew this and would drop back into a defense basically the opposite of what they were showing and we didn't have time to counter.
I say listen to SOS not because I expect Mullinz to drop the slow, ball control option and instead adopt a fun and gun, but because SOS' play calls actually had reads made by the QB and at least one WR to adjust the routes based on what defense was played up front (man/zone) and how many high safeties there were. He'd often call the same play five times in a row and it looked different each time if the defense changed. Now this required very smart QBs and for the WRs to be on the same page. It didn't always work, but with the right players it was damn near impossible to stop. The only answer was to blitz like crazy, which was totally against the nature of most conservative SEC coaches back then.