Again, here is the entire opinion:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf
Read it to your heart's desire.
Procedurally the trial court granted some of the players request. Both sides appealed. The court basically affirmed the court entirely.
The court rejected the student-athletes’ challenge to NCAA rules that limit athletic scholarships to the
full cost of attendance and that restrict compensation and
benefits unrelated to education. These may be price-fixing
agreements, but the court found them to be reasonable in
light of the possibility that “professional-level cash payments . . . could blur the distinction between college sports
and professional sports and thereby negatively affect consumer demand.” Ibid.
The court reached a different conclusion for caps on
education-related benefits—such as rules that limit scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or paid posteligibility internships. Id., at
1088. On no account, the court found, could such educationrelated benefits be “confused with a professional athlete’s
salary.” Id., at 1083. If anything, they “emphasize that the
recipients are students.” Ibid. Enjoining the NCAA’s restrictions on these forms of compensation alone, the court
concluded, would be substantially less restrictive than the
NCAA’s current rules and yet fully capable of preserving
consumer demand for college sports. Id., at 1088.
The court then entered an injunction reflecting its findings and conclusions. Nothing in the order precluded the
NCAA from continuing to fix compensation and benefits unrelated to education; limits on athletic scholarships, for example, remained untouched. The court enjoined the NCAA
only from limiting education-related compensation or benefits that conferences and schools may provide to student athletes playing Division I football and basketball. App. to
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 13
Opinion of the Court
Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–512, p. 167a, ¶1. The court’s injunction further specified that the NCAA could continue to limit
cash awards for academic achievement—but only so long as
those limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for
athletic achievement (currently $5,980 annually). Id., at
168a–169a, ¶5; Order Granting Motion for Clarification of
Injunction in No. 4:14–md–02541, ECF Doc. 1329, pp. 5–6
(ND Cal., Dec. 30, 2020). The court added that the NCAA
and its members were free to propose a definition of compensation or benefits “‘related to education.’” App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 20–512, at 168a, ¶4. And the court explained that the NCAA was free to regulate how conferences and schools provide education-related compensation
and benefits. Ibid. The court further emphasized that its
injunction applied only to the NCAA and multi-conference
agreements—thus allowing individual conferences (and the
schools that constitute them) to impose tighter restrictions
if they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6. The district court’s injunction
issued in March 2019, and took effect in August 2020.
Both sides appealed.
Blah blah blah rule of reason or not. Applying the Rule of Reason and analysis of less restrictive alternatives etc.
The district court enjoined only restrictions on
education-related compensation or benefits “that may be
made available from conferences or schools.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 20–512, at 167a, ¶1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as the student-athletes concede, the injunction
“does not stop the NCAA from continuing to prohibit compensation from” sneaker companies, auto dealerships, boosters, “or anyone else.” Brief for Respondents 47–48; see
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33. The
NCAA itself seems to understand this much. Following the
district court’s injunction, the organization adopted new
regulations specifying that only “a conference or institution” may fund post-eligibility internships. See Decl. of M.
Boyer in No. 4:14–md–02541, ECF Doc. 1302–2, p. 6 (ND
Cal., Sept. 22, 2020) (NCAA Bylaw 16.3.4(d)).
Even when it comes to internships offered by conferences
and schools, the district court left the NCAA considerable
flexibility. The court refused to enjoin NCAA rules prohibiting its members from providing compensation or benefits
unrelated to legitimate educational activities—thus leaving
the league room to police phony internships. As we’ve observed, the district court also allowed the NCAA to propose
(and enforce) rules defining what benefits do and do not relate to education. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–512, at
168a, ¶4. Accordingly, the NCAA may seek whatever limits on paid internships it thinks appropriate. And, again, the court stressed that individual conferences may restrict internships however they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6. All these features underscore the modesty of the current decree.
Second, the NCAA attacks the district court’s ruling that
it may fix the aggregate limit on awards schools may give
for “academic or graduation” achievement no lower than its
aggregate limit on parallel athletic awards (currently
$5,980 per year). Id., at 168a–169a, ¶5; D. Ct. Op., at 1104.
Third, the NCAA contends that allowing schools to provide in-kind educational benefits will pose a problem. This
relief focuses on allowing schools to offer scholarships for
“graduate degrees” or “vocational school” and to pay for
things like “computers” and “tutoring.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 20–512, at 167a–168a, ¶2. But the NCAA fears
schools might exploit this authority to give student-athletes
“‘luxury cars’” “to get to class” and “other unnecessary or
inordinately valuable items” only “nominally” related to education. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at 48–49.
Again, however, this over-reads the injunction in ways we
have seen and need not belabor. Under the current decree,
the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a
student’s actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing
a “no Lamborghini” rule. And, again, the district court invited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules delineating which benefits it considers legitimately related to education. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful
ambiguity really exists about the scope of its authority—
regarding internships, academic awards, in-kind benefits,
or anything else—it has been free to seek clarification from
the district court since the court issued its injunction three
years ago. The NCAA remains free to do so today. To date,
the NCAA has sought clarification only once—about the
precise amount at which it can cap academic awards—and
the question was quickly resolved. Before conjuring hypothetical concerns in this Court, we believe it best for the
NCAA to present any practically important question it has
in district court first.
Bla blah blah kicking NCAAs teeth in
Some will think the district court did not go far enough.
By permitting colleges and universities to offer enhanced
education-related benefits, its decision may encourage
scholastic achievement and allow student-athletes a measure of compensation more consistent with the value they
bring to their schools. Still, some will see this as a poor
substitute for fuller relief. At the same time, others will
think the district court went too far by undervaluing the
social benefits associated with amateur athletics. For our
part, though, we can only agree with the Ninth Circuit:
“‘The national debate about amateurism in college sports is
important. But our task as appellate judges is not to resolve
it. Nor could we. Our task is simply to review the district
court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust
law.’” 958 F. 3d, at 1265. That review persuades us the
district court acted within the law’s bounds.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Nothing in the opinion keeps the NCAA from prohibiting boosters from paying athletes nor has the NCAA changed the policy.
